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SHOULD A JOINT LOGISTICS COMMAND BE DEVELOPED
TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS?

BY

Colonel Warner T. Ferguson, Jr.
United States Army

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
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SHOULD A JOINT LOGISTICS COMMAND BE DEVELOPED
TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Should the United States military develop a Joint Logistics Command for future contingency operations? Recent contingency operations clearly indicate U.S. force projections in support of national policy will be joint operations.

The study in this paper reviews the recent history of support to joint operations. It discusses future contingency operations, logistical requirements, and contingency force composition.

Flexibility, duplication and consolidation of logistical support to the Theater Commander is discussed in light of economy of logistical effort while sustaining the forces. In this study, the assumption was made that the industrial base and transportation systems would provide sufficient logistical sustainment to the selected theater of operation. The problem then becomes the type organization required to provide command and control for reception, storage, onward movement, and continued sustainment of joint theater forces.

This paper concludes that the creation of a Joint Logistical Command for contingency operations, which would combine all Service logistical components under a single logistical operator, would make the best use of limited theater resources.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT.....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
 TEXT	
Introduction.....	1
Background.....	2
Future Contingency Operations.....	6
Logistical Requirements of Unified Commanders.....	8
Logistical Force Identification Process.....	9
Flexibility, Duplication, and Consolidation.....	11
Contingency Operations Force Composition.....	14
Joint Support Command Options.....	15
Jump Logistics Headquarters (TAACOM).....	18
Joint Contingency Corps Support Command.....	22
Conclusions.....	26
 APPENDIX I	
Logistical Responsibilities of the Theater Commander.....	29
 APPENDIX II	
Military Classes of Supply.....	30
ENDNOTES.....	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	34

INTRODUCTION

The more I have seen of the war, the more I realize how it depends upon administration and transportation (what our American allies call logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your Army and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can pace your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with these factors, and battles and wars are won only by taking risks.

Sir Archibald Wavell 1949¹

This quote clearly states the importance of logistical education for all leaders and reminds us that its mastery is key to military victory. Leaders must focus their attention on future joint contingency operations where knowledge of several Services' logistical capabilities is imperative.

The purpose of this paper is to provide answers to the question: Should a Joint Logistics Command be developed to support contingency operations? Because future operations are expected to be joint in nature, it is prudent to study ways of providing efficient support to joint organizations. This paper studies several support organization alternatives and how they may be employed to support joint contingency operations at the Theater Unified Commander(CINC) level. For the purpose of this paper, contingency operations are defined as:

Joint undertakings conducted within the framework of the Unified Command System. The size of a contingency, force, its mission, and its area of operations will vary.²

Recent contingency operations during the Gulf War indicate that some existing Service logistical support structures were duplicated by other Services and therefore are possible

candidates for consolidation under one command. Using the Gulf War as a guide for future large scale contingency operations, the support commands developed in this paper will be limited in scope to theater-level.

The three levels of logistical support are strategic, operational and tactical. Each supports the corresponding level of war. This paper focuses on the operational level of logistical support to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) at theater-level.³

Joint sustainment of the Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) theater forces is the major portion of support required at this level. Procedures outlined in joint publications provide general guidance for support for joint operations to the CINCs. The joint support commands I propose, as options to today's structures, indicate several ways of supporting future contingency operations by different means and organizations.

BACKGROUND

At the operational level of war, logistical support functions should use routine and standardized procedures to accomplish assigned missions. This also applies to other levels of logistical support. Support requirements include maintenance, supply, engineering, transportation, health services and various other services. A critical assumption is made that Department of Defense (DoD) supply systems can provide the CINCs with sufficient materiel to sustain operations and can move it to the appropriate theater. Based on this assumption, the task of

transporting materiel from ports to sustain joint forces becomes the problem. Commanders at the operational (theater) level must identify all operational requirements and establish priorities of support and means of distribution. In this context, all Services must provide total requirements to the CINC. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 4-0 (JCS Publication 4-0) states that "logistical functions should be standardized whenever possible without hampering operations". It goes on to state that "existing logistical policies and procedures of the separate Services should be used whenever possible".⁴ This guidance attempts to standardize procedures, but maintains Service lines for support.

Commanders of Unified Commands exercise command authority over forces assigned to them as directed by the Secretary of Defense.⁵ Unified Theater Commanders exercise directive authority over logistics operations in their theater under conditions short of war. This does not, however, release the Services from their responsibility to man, train, equip and sustain their components. Under wartime or similar conditions the CINC's authority is expanded to authorize combatant commanders the use of all logistical support appropriate to accomplish the mission.

As previously discussed, each Service is responsible for logistical support to its' forces under the present system. This is true except when other mutual agreements are established between national agencies, allies or other Services. During peacetime, the transfer of logistics functions from one Service to another requires concurrence of the Service or is directed

through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense for approval. In times of war, the CINC may direct transfers of responsibilities as necessary.⁶ Under the existing system, a peacetime and wartime organization exists and is encouraged, again along Service lines.

Each theater has different support requirements based on its location and maturity. For example, the European theater is a mature theater with existing Service logistical organizations and support bases as compared to the immature structures of Southwest Asia. The approach to planning and organizational support requirements are quite different in the immature or under-developed theater. Each CINC has responsibility to build an appropriate logistical support structure to sustain his particular theater. In mature theaters there is less tendency to look toward joint logistics for solutions because each Service developed its operations at different times and locations. This developmental process, linked to Service funding lines, creates uniquely separate logistical structures.

Contingency operations in the immature theaters generally develop quickly, are joint and combined in nature and require support for all Service forces. This leads the CINC to assign specific logistical functions to individual Services based on the dominant user concept or other valid reasons.⁷ The CINC has the responsibility to produce the most effective logistical support available to all forces and also has authority to direct Service activities and eliminate duplication wherever possible.

This is supported by guidance contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0 (JCS Publication 3-0) which states:

select forces to participate in operations based on their utility, required skills, expertise, combat readiness, and functions--not equity.⁸

In an effort to consolidate a number of logistical functions at the Department of Defense level, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) was created as a Combat Support Agency under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). It provides worldwide logistical support for operations of separate U.S. Military Services and Unified and Specified Commands during peace and war. Department of Defense (DoD) components and certain Federal agencies, foreign governments and other authorized organizations also receive support as directed.⁹

The General Services Administration also provides a large portion of common items and non-Service peculiar logistical support to the DoD.¹⁰ These two agencies are good examples of the efforts of DoD to consolidate logistical activities at the highest levels. They are designed to provide efficient, economical and practical support to military Services without duplication of effort.

As the logistical support moves toward the theater-level Service components, it becomes less and less joint in nature. At the theater-level, cross-Service support is presently provided by inter-Service support agreements. In times of war or conflict, these agreements are cumbersome, sometimes ineffective

and contain complicated reimbursement procedures. Reorganization is not always the correct answer to a new problem. However, minor changes may be required to remain current with the world situation. Mr. Cordiner states in his book, New Frontiers for Professional Managers:

The work of organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions. ¹¹

The argument to reorganize or centralize operations has supporters on both sides. JCS guidance to the CINCs is relatively specific as it relates to theater responsibilities. CINCs have the authority to organize as they determine appropriate, however JCS does not release the Services from responsibilities of their own logistical support.

FUTURE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Contingency operations are always joint undertakings conducted within the framework of the Unified Command System. ¹²

Past war plans and logistical support have focused on general global war. Recent operations in Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia point out that the Army, as well as other Services, will deploy on joint and combined contingency operations in the future. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the most likely conflicts will be in Third World countries and in those countries forming the Commonwealth of Independent States. Threats to U.S. national interests are more complex and broader, requiring a wide range of deterrence and

support capabilities. Advanced weaponry encountered in some Third World countries are sophisticated and can pose a formidable threat to U.S. forces.

A new national military strategy is emerging to meet the changing threat. General Vuono stated:

the new military strategy is built on the four foundations of strategic deterrence, forward presence, rapid response to regional crisis and reconstitution to reestablish a global warfighting capability.¹³

With budget and personnel cuts, future operations will require more of each Services' capabilities to defeat the enemy. This approach lends credence to the idea of combining all theater logistical efforts under a single logistics commander, thereby creating more efficiency in support of future joint operations.

Although the likelihood of global conflict is reduced, we cannot afford to disregard its potential. By improving readiness and sustainability of our forces, inter-theater mobility, and host nation support, peace can be maintained and war deterred.¹⁴

Regardless the type of future contingency operations in which U.S. forces may find themselves, joint logistical considerations are critical for success. Centralized logistical planning must be comprehensive and continuous. Each phase of the operation must include indepth logistical planning and support for success.¹⁵

In a recent lecture presented to the 1992 Army War College Class, titled "Approaching the Future," the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command was emphatic when he said, "Forget logistics and you lose." This simple, but true statement, emphasizes

the importance of future logistical planning in support of contingencies.

LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS of UNIFIED COMMANDS

Coordinated logistics is essential for successful support to theater forces. Unified Commands were developed to bring all available resources together in support of the CINCs' missions. Without this central control and direction, essential logistical needs may not be met. Admiral Eccles stated:

The command point of view is that logistics itself has no purpose other than to create and to support combat forces which are responsive to the needs of command.¹⁶

It is essential that commanders understand the degree and nature of logistics control to ensure they achieve full combat effectiveness. Theater CINCs may elect to organize their commands on either an area or functional basis. The area technique incorporates efforts of the assigned Service components and fixes responsibility for various routine operations and support. Area organization establishes command lines and procedures for coordinating logistical support to units moving through a specific area.

Functional command organization is based solely on military functions without respect to geographical areas. Functions in a military operation determine the Service to perform the support mission. In this process, Service integrity should be maintained when possible.¹⁷

The CINCs have a broad base of logistical responsibility,

whether they choose to organize the theater on an area or functional basis. One of the most pressing requirements is to reduce the amount of U.S. logistical support required in theater by thorough use of Host Nation Support (HNS). This determination is important so future joint operations and inter-Service support agreements can be accurately prepared and excesses eliminated. Recently, operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort relied heavily on HNS for supply, services and transportation. This freed U.S. personnel and equipment for use in direct support missions and significantly reduced transportation shipping costs from the United States and Europe. Appendix I provides a list of specific logistical responsibilities each CINC should address. CINCs must determine the best way to accomplish missions and employ the resources provided during peace and war.¹⁸

Accurate and timely planning at the CINC level is critical for success. At the battalion or brigade level, wrong decisions can be corrected in hours while decisions at theater-level may take days or weeks to change. It is therefore important to accurately forecast and anticipate requirements due to the slowness encountered when attempting to make quick changes at theater-level.

LOGISTICAL FORCE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

Theater planners determine which logistical functions will be provided by a single Service or by a joint effort. The logistical planners identify mobility, sustainability, and infrastruc-

ture requirements necessary for combat service support of the theater operations. Agreements are reached on common, joint, or cross-Service support. As a minimum, responsibilities are fixed for providing medical, maintenance, salvage, transportation and mortuary affairs. Units are identified and command and control established for Rear Area contingency operations. Requirements for civilian contractors and host-nation support operations are identified and integrated into the support plan.¹⁹ Thorough planning will identify the vast majority of requirements and types of support units needed. Flexibility must be maintained and adjustments to force requirements made based on mission changes and forecasted requirements.

JCS Publication 4-0 outlines full planning procedures and principles for joint logistical support. Standardization of logistical support, deployment procedures and equipment interoperability will greatly assist in the sustainment of joint operations.²⁰

As previously discussed, the CINC has vast resources at his disposal for support of combat operations. The J-4 staff must coordinate directly with the J-3 planners to fully integrate support capabilities with all identified Service combat requirements. The J-4 and his staff are logistical planners not operators. The staff cannot simultaneously control support units, conduct support missions and do its primary staff planning and coordination for the Theater CINC. An operational logistics command is required to execute joint support missions. During

the deliberate planning and staff estimate process, specific requirements, unit capabilities and units are identified to support the CINC's logistical mission. This describes the force identification process. ²¹

FLEXIBILITY, DUPLICATION, and CONSOLIDATION

The flexible employment of forces is the central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well... flexibility in command can be realized only through the discovery of order, light, and certainty amidst such circumstances peculiar to war as confusion, darkness, and uncertainty.²²

--Mao Tse-Tung

Before going further in the discussion leading to support of joint contingency operations, it is important to discuss several thoughts on flexibility, duplication and consolidation. Flexibility and duplication are not synonymous, however they do complement each other in most military operations. Consolidation, on the other hand, does not always efficiently support flexibility and duplication. There has been recent discussion that the Services are rampant with duplication, therefore implying this is not appropriate. Consolidation of supply activities at the DoD level is presently ongoing with depot operations coming under the control of the Defense Logistics Agency. This move was made to eliminate duplication of effort and create a central control for like items of all Services. This in itself is not a bad idea, however not all activities lend themselves to centralization. If all support activities become centralized then true flexibility is lost. This was demonstrated

by the German decentralization of manufacturing and supply operations during WW II. We do not face the same problems that Germany faced, however placing all of our supply "eggs" in one basket still applies during war.

Simply by sheer numbers, costs of duplicate operations or backup supply facilities in different locations will be greater than operating one or two facilities. Consolidation comes with other trade-offs to the customer.

A recent high level Army guest speaker at the Army College said:

Centralization is not always good. It becomes too time consuming, therefore less efficient to the customer. Proper balance is necessary.

He went on to say:

The tendency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is to think that consolidation automatically reduces costs of operation by 10%. Purple is not always better. Many civilian organizations have determined centralization is not always more effective.

The argument for more centralization is based on several assumptions or allegations. These allegations are:

1. There is extensive duplication of logistical efforts and organizations in the three Services.
 2. Because of this duplication, there is inefficiency in the Services.
 3. A lack of centralized control is the reason for 1 and 2.
- Rear Admiral Eccles indicates that there are generally two schools of thought. One advocates more centralization with more civilian control and the other with less civilian control. There

are also those who believe a single military Service will solve the problems of control. He goes on to say that efficiency in logistics systems is being reached and centralization of effort may actually create waste. One key point Eccles makes is that all duplication is not harmful. Discriminant duplication, in fact, may be beneficial. Intentional duplication of logistical support may be necessary to achieve mobility and flexibility. This is just as true for combat operations as it is for logistical operations.²³

Effects of consolidation at the national and strategic levels are loss of flexibility and no back-up of supplies if all duplication is eliminated. If victory is the object of the war effort, considerations other than costs are important factors. In war, timeliness is more important than costs. During times of peace, we tend to forget this principle.

As support moves toward the theater-level, consolidation of support becomes less attractive to some commanders. This is true because commanders want to control their own destiny or at least think they can. At theater-level, consolidation of support efforts can actually create flexibility for commanders, while maximizing use of valuable support and transportation assets.

In a 1989 study conducted by the U.S. Army Logistics Center, now the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, the use of logistics nodes to support consumers is discussed. The nodes are designed to consolidate commodities and services for delivery to customers. Each node has asset visibility of all operational

inventories and allows the logistical manager to redistribute and support units on an area basis.²⁴ Consolidation of logistical support by node is an effective approach to control limited resources. This study is, however, only focused at Army-level and not on joint operations where it would also be beneficial.

Where, at what level and how much consolidation is appropriate are the questions to be answered. The idea of consolidating support functions under a joint command is the basis for the remainder of this paper.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FORCE COMPOSITION

The current edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, does not take into account U.S. Marine, Air Force or Navy assets and capabilities as part of the total force. JCS Publication 3-0, does give specific guidance to the CINCs for the organization of their theaters. Because of these doctrinal disconnects, it is extremely difficult to determine the force size, Service involvement and support requirements of the contingency force. GEN Carl E. Mundy Jr, Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated what he thinks could be the foundation for an affordable, rapid deployment contingency force. He said:

The task force should have a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division with a naval task force comprised of an amphibious and/or a carrier battle group and an Air Force composite wing, under a designated joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

This provides an indication of the type of joint contingency force that may be established. Again, each contingency is

different and will grow based on the political and strategic situation.

For the purpose of this paper, the contingency force requiring support is predominately Army, with Marine, Air Force and Navy elements stationed in the area of operations.

JOINT SUPPORT COMMAND OPTION

There is no school solution for the ratio of combat troops to number of combat/combat service support troops. Numerous attempts have been made to provide an answer, however the final solution depends on the situation. Martin Van Creveld discusses this issue in his book Supplying War. His writings indicate that over the years, no specific combatant to support troop ratio was established. He discusses that even though ratios may be established and detail plans made based on these numbers, political or strategic changes may make them completely obsolete in short time. Van Creveld indicates that most armies over the past centuries have prepared themselves as best as they could on an ad hoc basis.²⁶ This is not to say there should not be detailed support plans and that every war should be put together on an ad hoc basis. It does infer, however, that flexibility in organization is critical while applying the right support at the right time. Based on his observations from Operation Desert Storm, General Franks, Commander, USATRADOC, and VII Corps Commander during Desert Storm, stated:

Combat service support leaders must task organize and adjust to theater realities and force support

requirements.²⁷

This supports Van Creveld's theory that logistic support has been ad hoc, thus flexible, either by chance or design.

During Operation Desert Storm, the Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) requested, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, that the Army be assigned as Executive Agent for support responsibilities to begin between C+30 and C+60. The responsibilities included inland surface transportation, port operations, Class I, selected Class II and IV, Class III (bulk fuel distribution), Class V (common munitions), backup water support, Class VIII (medical), veterinary services, construction support, and graves registration (GRREG). At this point, a Joint Theater Army Support Command was formed with support from other Services.

Host nation support was used to a great extent to fill voids until U.S. support could be obtained. In the case of transportation, the void could have never been filled by U.S. assets. Many support activities were not provided until after C+60 because support and supplies were not in country. The Combat Service Support (CSS) process was also hindered because of the slow identification and understanding of other Services' requirements.

Once a Service is identified as Executive Agent for CSS, certain responsibilities are inherent in the operation. There is a requirement to establish the proper staff and force structure and materiel utilization bill for the Service that must provide the support to other Services. All of these requirements must be

considered when deciding the type organization required to support combat operations.²⁸

The suggested joint support command options in this paper each have their own merit. Naturally, some are better than others. During this process, not only are other Services considered, but thought also must be given to the correct reserve and active duty mix, with optimum use of coalition forces and interagency activities. Given the regional nature of future threats, support commands must be developed to consider the most probable options. Functions and types of support provided are generally the same in each type of support command. The main differences in each option are (1) how the staffs are formed, (2) who provides them and (3) the size of the contingency operation. This paper will not discuss numbers of personnel or types and numbers of units for each support command. Each command will require some modification based on the situation.

The first Joint Contingency Support Command option discussed is developed at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) with the second option at Joint Contingency Corps level. During Operation Desert Storm, an Army force structure shortfall was discovered as certain forces required for sustainment were inadequately sourced in the Active Component (AC) and only located in the Reserve Component (RC). This caused the Army to seek out RC volunteers as fillers for deployment assistance while waiting for the political decision to activate RC units.²⁹ The following options are designed to create organizations that are capable of quickly

providing combat service support to in theater units.

JUMP LOGISTICS HEADQUARTERS,

THEATER ARMY AREA COMMAND (TAACOM)

The first option is the Jump Logistics Headquarters (TAACOM) based on the Army theater support organization. Each theater has a designated Theater Army Area Command, however not all of those TAACOMs are adequately staffed and fully operational. For example, the 21st TAACOM, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), is fully operational and has a day-to-day mission. On the other hand, the 22nd TAACOM, U.S. Army, Central Command (USARCENT) was an ad hoc organization put together to support Desert Shield/Storm using active and reserve forces. In major contingency operations, the corps will probably be the force used since, doctrinally, a corps is the smallest organization capable of sustaining itself for long periods. If the forces deployed do not grow any larger than a corps, then only TAACOM liaison cells will be deployed to provide coordination with the TAACOM. As the theater forces grow larger than corps operations, then Echelons Above Corps (EAC) units begin providing support to the corps. During the deployment process, the TAACOM builds its forces in conjunction with the corps forces. Once the size of the operation exceeds that of a corps, the TAACOM forms the nucleus for CSS operations and becomes the command and control (C2) element between the corps and the overall joint command.

Time of handoff between corps and TAACOM will depend on the

tactical situation and support missions. Following handoff of support missions to the TAACOM, the corps will focus its support efforts only on corps units. The CSS base may also start with existing TAACOM headquarters elements and EAC units in conjunction with corps units.³⁰

Army Field Manual 63-4 does not discuss joint support operations of the TAACOM. Field Manual 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps, does state:

the TAACOM is organized to support deployed US Army forces and (if required) other US Services and allies.³¹

Future operations will surely be joint and combined, therefore there should be more written about joint operational planning in these Army Field Manuals.

During contingency operations in which the CINC and his staff are deployed, at least part of the TAACOM HQ should deploy to provide the appropriate command and control for theater CSS operations. The Jump TAACOM is one solution to get a quick command and control element on location. In a built-up theater, a forward-deployed TAACOM cell may be appropriate. In an immature theater, a small staff is required initially to perform all command and control functions of the standard TAACOM staff. TAACOM staff members should be ready and their positions marked to ensure the capability for early deployment of the Jump TAACOM HQ staff.

During routine training exercises, the staff should deploy and exercise with elements of the CSS units they will command during contingency operations. Staff positions requiring joint

liaison personnel should be identified and commitments made from other Services for those personnel during training and contingency operations. The joint staff would work common joint logistical issues and priorities established by the CINC. It is critical for the Jump TAACOM HQ to be joint and have joint plans. The TAACOMs must be linked by plans to all theater level contingency operations. They must deploy with sufficient communications and transportation assets to be selfsustaining.

Units identified for early deployment must be active duty or be RC units capable of arriving in sufficient time to support initial combat forces. The Jump TAACOM HQ will form the initial CSS cell and prepare to receive further TAACOM staff and CSS units. Corps support commands should not be saddled with the initial theater CSS responsibility, since corps are normally single Service organizations or, at most, purely the ground component (joint or combined). The Jump TAACOM HQ in a mature theater has the advantage of a standing staff and prior established working relationships with EAC CSS units and other Services. TAACOMs are not joint staffs and would require positions filled on a permanent basis or, at a minimum, manned during training exercises. The joint liaison or staff personnel issue is critical for success in a joint theater of operations. Replacements for TAACOM staff positions vacated by the Jump TAACOM HQ can be filled by Individual Ready Reserve(IRR) on a short-notice basis. The Jump TAACOM HQ should not be made up of RC personnel because of the rapid deployment requirement. Joint

staff requirements could be filled from dual positioned personnel on the theater CINC and component commander staffs. This approach would place liaison persons on the TAACOM staff capable of rapidly interfacing with their parent organizations.

Whether the TAACOM is in a mature or immature theater, the Jump TAACOM HQ must have sufficient AC and joint Service representatives to support the forces for the first thirty days. Follow-on CSS force structure should consist of the appropriate AC/RC mixture to support further theater development.

Initial functions provided by the Jump TAACOM HQ must be oriented on Host Nation Support coordination, receiving, forward movement and follow-on sustainment. During this process, last minute tailoring may be required to meet changing situations.

During Operation Provide Comfort, 1991, a type of Jump TAACOM HQ was deployed from USAREUR to coordinate all logistical operations. Initial problems developed because the TAACOM staff was not joint. Much of the support provided was to the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force in addition to some coalition forces. Interoperability problems, which resulted from no prior working relationships, were solved through liaison teams to the TAACOM from other Services and EUCOM J-4 staff.

Problems in basing support capabilities, transportation, and helicopter refueling procedures are examples of the areas requiring joint staff attention. Many problems could have been resolved early on if the TAACOM had been a joint staff from the beginning.

The Jun - TAACOM HQ option is best suited for the mature theater where the TAACOM is established and operational. It can also support contingency forces, on an area basis, with common supply items.

JOINT CONTINGENCY CORPS SUPPORT COMMAND

The second option supports a smaller contingency operation where few theater assets are deployed. As the concept for a Joint Contingency Corps develops, logistical support considerations are essential for success. Dedicated joint logistical support with centralized control and decentralized execution is an effective means of providing support. Dedicated support is generally believed to be more efficient than area support given sufficient support organizations are available for all concerned.

Problems with the existing organizations have led to discussions of the need for a Joint Contingency Corps. In this process, logistical areas that lend themselves to joint support should be placed under the control of one support organization. As early as 1917, Marine Lieutenant Colonel George Thorpe wrote:

Features of Logistics that are not peculiar to either the land or naval forces, but common to both, and where they can be exercised in unity, in the interests of economy and efficiency, they should be organized as a national Logistics.³⁷

This statement was directed to higher level logistics; however, it also applies to sustainment at theater and corps-levels.

The first option, which discussed the Jump TAACOM HQ with supporting CSS units, was directed at EAC operations. As the

Joint Contingency Corps would generally be smaller than the TAACOM operation, joint functions carried out by the larger TAACOM would become the responsibility of the Joint Contingency Corps Support Command(JCCSC). The Joint Contingency Corps Support Command would coordinate unity of supply, services and support effort. Common supply items,(Classes I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, and X), in addition to transportation, services, Host Nation Support coordination and contracting, will form the bulk of JCCSC operations. Additional functions include the receipt, storage and onward movement of all items shipped into the theater. The U.S. Army, Air Force, Marines and Navy forces will provide support requirements through the Contingency Corps J-4 for requirements validation, to the Support Command for execution of common support. Appendix II contains a listing of the military classes of supply.

The U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., is designated for emergency deployments anywhere in the world and therefore is the Army's present Contingency Corps. It is not joint in design or function. There are numerous liaison teams that work on the Corps staff but this does not make it a joint operation. To make a truly joint Contingency Corps, units, personnel and equipment from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines must become part of the Contingency Corps. If the choice is made to create a Joint Contingency Corps, then much thought must go into forming the proper Joint Contingency Corps Support Command with all Services represented.

The organization of the Joint Contingency Corps Support Command(JCCSC) would be similar in structure to that of the 22nd TAACOM formed during Desert Storm. The headquarters should be sized at approximately 100 persons, commanded by an Army Major General, with the Service mix proportional to the tactical units of the Contingency Corps. The existing Army 1st Corps Support Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, would form the nucleus for the JCCSC, augmented with Air Force, Navy and Marine personnel and units.

In the zero sum personnel process, it is understood that spaces for a new headquarters will be difficult to obtain from the Services. As the bill payer, I suggest eliminating a portion of the Army Reserve Component positions in organizations that formed the ad hoc 22nd TAACOM and using those spaces to fill the new headquarters staff. The new headquarters would be a standing organization with representation from each Service and have the day-to-day mission support to the Contingency Corps. All joint support functions will be controlled by the JCCSC with coordination conducted in those areas that are Service unique. Combat Service Support units must be able to deploy in conjunction with the Contingency Corps forces. If this cannot happen, then the purpose for the JCCSC is negated.

Recent operations during Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Provide Comfort reinforce this point. Initially, insufficient support forces were deployed to the Gulf region to facilitate reception and onward movement of early arriving forces and

supplies. Many reasons caused this to occur. However, the result was a backlog at the ports and delays in onward movement. This lesson learned is important for future contingency operations.

It is critical that units work in peacetime as they do in war. Peacetime collocation of the JCCSC with the Contingency Corps is highly desirable in order to foster and form solid support relationships. This approach will eliminate the need for ad hoc logistical support organizations.

Until an approved operation/contingency plan, which would place the JCCSC under the command and control of a specific CINC, is implemented, the JCCSC would remain under the command and control of the U.S. Army Forces Commander. Liaison cell augmentation from the CINC's J-4 staff may be required to assist in coordination with other headquarters. Since multiple logistical systems compete for resources, the JCCSC can make the most efficient use of all assets available to theater forces.

During a recent interview with LTG James D. Starling, USA, on the subject of developing a Joint Contingency Corps Support Command, he shared his views as the past J-4/7, United States Central Command. He said:

I think it (Joint Logistics Corps Support Command) is a good idea, but don't think it will work because Services will not give up personnel to create a new headquarters. It will also create another bureaucratic headquarters with layering of staffs.³³

The price of forming a new headquarters is higher than modifying an existing one for joint operations. However, payoff

in increased rapid deployment capability and dedicated support to the Joint Contingency Corps may outweigh the costs. JCCSC would be effective in a theater where there is no established theater logistical support and a quickly organized joint support operation may not be adequate for the task.

CONCLUSIONS

General Vuono, former Army Chief of Staff, wrote in a recent paper on Joint Operations Concept:

Joint Operations is one of the key enabling concepts under the Army's emerging umbrella concept, Airland Operations. Joint logistical relationships are established early to facilitate current operations and coordinate actions for the rapid employment of follow-on forces.³⁴

These are very strong and forward looking thoughts coming from a Service chief. It only lends credence to the fact that future operations will be joint and we must plan for success now. The present support systems at theater-level and below are Service responsibilities. This paper discussed several options that create joint logistical support operations where economy of force and unity of effort better serve the CINCs.

Existing support arrangements between several different Services are accomplished by inter-Service support agreements. This approach has worked in the past, however there is a reluctance to depend on other Services for support. Support systems developed in each theater or in support of a Contingency Corps must be able to transition quickly to wartime operations. As previously discussed, common supply and services can be more

efficiently provided by joint logistical operations and meet the needs of all Services. Each Service, as directed by JCS, has the responsibility of providing their own logistical support. Because of this, support systems and commands have developed along service lines and parochial attitudes evolved creating inefficiency.

As all Services reduce in size, while attempting to maintain adequate combat and support capabilities, it becomes imperative that new and innovative ways of doing business evolve. The two options presented herein create new joint structures requiring each Service to give up some personnel and control for the good of a unified effort. Each option has its own benefits which hinge on the development of some form of a joint contingency force. If the Joint Contingency Corps is not developed, the Jump TAACOM HQ option is appropriate for support of joint operations larger than corps. If the Joint Contingency Corps is developed, dedicated support is preferred. In an environment of reduced budgets and declining resources, it is imperative that support duplication be reduced and Service parochialism eliminated. Each Service has different concerns about sustainment which require close coordination and attention. Development of joint logistical commands is the most prudent action for integrated support and rapid transition to war. This approach will allow the CINCs to more completely meet their logistical support requirements in future contingency operations.

A study prepared by the National War College in 1946, titled

Joint Overseas Operations, contained many of the thoughts now embodied in JCS Pub 4-0. The report described in detail the joint responsibilities of the theater commander. A disclaimer in the studies preface states:

The study contains statements concerning the employment of forces and their logistical support on which there exists certain unresolved differences in concept among the Ground, Naval and Air Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not, therefore, accepted the study as an expression of approved joint doctrine.⁵⁵

Then, as now, the subject of Joint Theater Logistics was a much debated and unresolved issue. Clearly, support systems must be looked at differently because support cannot continue to be provided as it has been in the past. Joint support and coordination are required for future operations. Operational plans and requirements drive the force structure for CSS units. Support must be linked to solid requirements identified in each theater by the Services. A Joint Logistical Command for contingency operations ties together all Service components in the theater under a single logistical operator. Consolidation of Service requirements for joint logistical support of common supply items and the application of resources from all Services is the best method to meet theater contingency force needs.

If the Services cannot come to an agreement on joint support, then the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress will surely make the decision for joint support organizations and it may be markedly different than that desired by the Services.

APPENDIX I

LOGISTICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE THEATER COMMANDER

- Coordination of supply support between the Service components.
- Responsible for maintaining an effective distribution network throughout the theater.
- Responsible for provisions of supplies to civilians in occupied areas.
- Responsible for coordination of maintenance within the command.
- Responsible for coordinating salvage procedures within the command.
- General engineering and base development.
- Issues procurement guidance within the command.
- Responsible for coordination and integration of health service support within the command.
- Responsible for the search, recovery, identification, care and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel within their AOR.
- Responsible for the command, control and communication systems.
- Will identify materiel required for regional minimum essential security assistance.
- Coordinate Host Nation Support.

Information extracted from JCS Pub 4-0, June 1990.

APPENDIX II

MILITARY CLASSES OF SUPPLY

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CLASS I -----Subsistence, food and water
CLASS II -----Individual clothing and equipment
CLASS III -----Fuel, both packaged and bulk
CLASS IV -----Barrier and construction material
CLASS V -----Ammunition
CLASS VI -----Personal items
CLASS VII -----Major end items of equipment
CLASS VIII -----Medical items and associated
                    equipment
CLASS IX -----Repair parts
CLASS X -----Civil affairs support items

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